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"Natural Incubators": Somatic Support as
Reproductive Technology, and the Comparative
Constitutional Implications on Cases of Maternal
Brain Death in the U.S., Canada, and Ireland
Sonya Laddon Rahders*
INTRODUCTION
"Using a dead woman's body as an incubator against her wishes . .
should be of grave concern to everyone who cares for and about both
women and our nation's moral health."'
Heart-wrenching stories pepper the media at an increasingly alarming
rate: young mothers, beloved wives and daughters, rendered incapacitated
by sad accidents or unexpected illness. Any time a person enters a coma or
is diagnosed as brain dead, their family faces a limited array of painful
options for treatment. But one condition adds even further complexities to
those choices. What happens when a pregnant person is diagnosed as brain
dead? This issue has arisen in a handful of recent high-profile cases,
* J.D., 2015, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., 2012,
Sociology and Women's Studies, University of California, Los Angeles. This article is the
product of two research papers written under the guidance of Professors Radhika Rao and
Osagie K. Obasogie at UC Hastings, to whom I am infinitely grateful. Thank you also to
Dr. Christian Jagusch for helping me dissect the medical literature; and to the wonderful
HWLJ staff, especially Ali Nicolette, for her tireless edits and honest critiques. Finally,
thanks to my dear friends and family for listening to me talk about maternal brain death for
the past two years.
1. Abuhasna Said, et al., A Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman with Prolonged Somatic
Support and Successful Neonatal Outcome: A Grand Rounds Case with a Detailed Review
of Literature and Ethical Considerations, 3:3 INT'L J. OF CRITICAL ILLNESS AND INJ. SCI.

220, 222 (2013), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24404463 ("although
maternal care during brain death incurs significant costs, increasing the intrauterine time
where the brain-dead mother can serve as 'a natural incubator' can positively affect neonatal
outcomes and therefore can reduce the duration of stay in the NICU and associated costs.");
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REv 359, 410 (2000)
("laws literally 'take' the bodies of incompetent pregnant women, treat them as chattel that
may be drafted into service as fetal incubators for the state."); Jeffrey L. Ecker, Death in
Pregnancy-An American Tragedy, 370:10 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889, 891 (2014), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMpl400969.
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garnering a variety of responses and outcomes. People who are brain dead
are in fact considered dead by medical professionals, but despite uniform
medical standards there is a significant amount of grey-area in terms of
whether doctors believe them to be truly dead, or instead severely
comatose. Courts have even murkier guidelines, and cases of maternal
brain death are treated differently internationally.
Two contrasting cases that occurred in the U.S., for example, are those
of Marlise Mufioz and Karla Perez. In Texas in late 2013, Marlise Muiioz
was rendered brain dead after suffering a brain embolism when she was
just fourteen weeks pregnant. Against the wishes of her husband and
family, the hospital kept her on somatic support, citing a state law that
requires pregnant people to be kept on "life" support. 2 Her husband sued to
have her removed from support and allowed to die. While the court
ultimately ruled that she should be removed from support, the hospital
acquiesced prior to the decision because the fetus was no longer viable.
Karla Perez, by contrast, collapsed in Nebraska in early 2015 while twentytwo weeks pregnant. Ms. Perez was kept "alive" on support for fifty-four
days and a healthy baby was delivered via cesarean section in May 2015.3
This is a subject of limited medical study, with only thirty cases
reported worldwide between 1982 and 2010.4 As such, it is also a subject
of very limited legal inquiry. A 2013 grand rounds study from the United
Arab Emirates concluded that medical technology has reached such an
advanced stage that gestational age is no longer a barrier to whether or not
a pregnant person may be kept on somatic support until the fetus is
delivered.5 After a healthy birth resulted from somatic support of one
individual who was declared brain dead at just sixteen weeks' gestation, the
study concluded that a brain dead pregnant person might serve as a "natural
incubator."
This comment examines the subject of brain death in pregnancy
through the lenses of both reproductive technologies and constitutional
rights. Drawing comparisons between three very different countries, this
comment seeks to contribute to the legal dialogue about what rights an
individual has against the state in cases of maternal brain death, and what
the implications may be for assisted reproductive technologies and
reproductive rights in the future. In part one, to explore the meaning of
2. "Life support" generally refers to the medical interventions used to provide a body
with nutrients and oxygen when it cannot do so on its own. Throughout this paper, however,
I will use the more technical term "somatic support," or simply "support," since a brain dead
body is medically dead, and thus cannot have sustained life.
3. Alexander Smith, Brain-Dead Nebraska Mom Karla Perez Kept Alive to Deliver
Baby, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/womens-health/braindead-nebraska-mom-karla-perez-kept-coma-2-months-n351716.
4. Majid Esmaeilzadeh, et al., One Life Ends, Another Begins: Management of a BrainDead Pregnant Mother-A Systematic Review, 8:74 BMC MEDICINE *1
(2010),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/i 741-7015/8/74.
5. Said, et al., supra note 1, at 220.
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brain death, I examine three cases of brain death that each incited
controversy when they arose concurrently in late 2013 in the United States
and Canada. I compare treatment of Marlise Mufioz in Texas with
treatment of Jahi McMath in California, a young girl who was declared
brain dead in late 2013 but whose parents fought to keep her on somatic
support; and Robyn Benson, declared brain dead in Canada at twenty-two
weeks pregnant but whose husband and family wished to keep her on
somatic support. In Ms. Benson's case, a healthy baby was ultimately
delivered via cesarean section. Barely a year later, in late 2014, a third case
arose in Ireland where a woman referred to as N.P. was forcibly kept on
life support after brain death, based on Ireland's laws that confer the same
rights to a fetus as they do to a woman.6 Each of these countries has at
least one additional recorded case of maternal brain death within the past
twenty years (Maria Lopez, California, U.S., 1999; Sophia Park, Toronto,
Canada, 1999; Unnamed, Ireland, 2001).7
In part two, this comment compares the constitutional law and rights
that govern each of these cases in the U.S., Canada, and Ireland. For each
country, I outline recent cases of maternal brain death. I then explain their
context through the respective courts' historic treatment of brain death, and
the sometimes-conflicting Constitutional provisions that govern the subject.
Each country has differing views on-and differing Constitutional
protections for-a series of more common issues that arise when
considering maternal brain death. In trying to make sense of the laws and
morals that inform debates about maternal brain death, this comment
outlines each country's treatment of abortion, the right to refuse health
care, death with dignity laws, and organ donation.
I. BRAIN DEATH IN THE MODERN CONTEXT
A. MARLISE MU1ROZ, ROBYN BENSON, AND JAHI MCMATH: PREGNANT,
INCAPACITATED, BRAIN DEAD, AND AT THE MERCY OF THE STATE.

1. Marlise Mufioz (Tarrant County, Texas)
In late November 2013, a young woman collapsed in her Texas home.
Marlise Mufioz was rushed to the hospital, where she was declared brain
dead from lack of oxygen caused by a possible blood clot in her lung. At
the time of her collapse Mufioz was thirty-three years old and fourteen
weeks pregnant. Her body, which had been kept on ventilators while
physicians tried to save her life, immediately became the subject of a
6. Tracey Parece, Brain-DeadPregnant Woman Dies After 3 Irish Court Judges Allow
Family To Remove Life Support, INQUISITR (Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/

1705737/brain-dead-pregnant-woman-dies-after-3-irish-court-judges-allow-family-toremove-life-support/#Vf4kcA9WF2jg9gk3.99.
7. DANIEL SPERLING, MANAGEMENT
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS viii (2006).
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terrifying controversy: what would happen to the fetus she carried? Erick
Mufioz, Marlise's husband, asked physicians to remove her from
ventilators. Both Erick and Marlise worked as paramedics, and they had
discussed Marlise's firm wishes not to be kept alive by machines should
the situation arise. But the hospital refused the husband's wishes, citing a
provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act that says pregnant persons
shall not be removed from life support.8 Despite the early gestational age
of the Mufioz fetus, and the clear indicators that the fetus was likely no
longer viable, the hospital maintained that it must keep Marlise on
ventilators for at least several more weeks until a firm judgment could be
made about the viability of the fetus. 9
In January 2014, when the Texas hospital continued to keep Marlise
Mufioz "alive" on life support, Erick Mufioz filed a petition in Tarrant
County District Court requesting that the court compel John Peter Smith
Hospital to remove his wife's body from the medical technology so that his
family could dispose of her remains in peace. The emergency motion, filed
January 14, 2014, alleged that the Texas statute could not apply to Marlise:
"Marlise cannot possibly be a 'pregnant patient' - Marlise is dead."10
Should the court disagree that her status as dead mooted the statutory issue,
the motion raised two alternative Constitutional bases for Marlise to be
removed from treatment. First, the hospital had violated Marlise's
Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights under Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep 't

of Health by not allowing her to refuse medical treatment." Second, the
hospital violated Marlise's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment by treating her, as a member of a class of pregnant women,
different from other persons.1 2 The court ultimately agreed that Mufioz was
being unlawfully maintained on somatic support, and she was removed in
mid-January after nearly eight weeks. The fetus did not reach a state of
viability during that time.

8. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 1999).
9. Complaint at 3-5, Muihoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 017-270080-14 (Tarrant
Cty. TX Dist. Ct., Jan. 14, 2014); see also, Andrea Grimes, Texas Law Forces Hospital,
Family to Keep Pregnant Woman on Life Support Against Her Will, RH REALITY CHECK
(Dec. 23, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/12/23/texas-law-forceshospital-family-to-keep-pregnant-woman-on-life-support-against-her-will/;
Wade
Goodwyn, The Strange Case Of Marlise Munoz And John Peter Smith Hospital, NPR.coM
(Jan. 28, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/01/28/267759687/thestrange-case-of-marlise-munoz-and-john-peter-smith-hospital.
10. Emergency Motion at 2, Mufioz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 017-270080-14
(Tarrant Cty. TX Dist. Ct., Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://thaddeuspope.com/images
/Munoz_v._JPSJan_2014_.pdf.
11. Emergency Motion, supra note I1, at 6 (citing Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 278 (1990)).
12. Emergency Motion, supra note 11, at 7.
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2. Robyn Benson (Victoria, B.C., Canada)
In December 2013, Robyn Benson collapsed from a brain
hemorrhage, and was declared brain dead a short while later. She was
thirty-two years old and twenty-two weeks pregnant. At her husband's
request, Benson was kept on a ventilator for six weeks, and a baby boy was
delivered at twenty-eight weeks through caesarean section. Although
premature the baby was otherwise healthy, and Robyn was removed from
3
life support the next day.'
There are several differences between the Benson and Mufioz cases,
most notably the gestational age of the fetus and the family's wishes. There
are jurisdictional similarities and differences, as well, which are addressed
4
in further detail below. Posthumous reproduction is illegal in Canada and
restricted in the U.S. In addition, Canada enforces different abortion
standards that give more decision-making power to the pregnant person.
These legal standards undoubtedly contributed to the relative lack of
controversy surrounding Benson's pregnancy and death, but she is
nevertheless an important counterpart to the Mufioz legal battle.
3. Jahi McMath (Alameda County, California)
Only weeks after Marlise Mufioz collapsed in November 2013, a
family in California was also struggling with brain death. Jahi McMath
was a thirteen-year-old girl who suffered complications from surgeries to
remove her tonsils and alleviate sleep apnea. She never recovered from the
surgery and was declared brain dead at Oakland Children's Hospital in
early December 2013. Jahi's parents, however, refused to accept this
diagnosis. Citing their faith that God would restore Jahi's health, and their
"belief' that she was still alive, the family filed a temporary restraining
order in Alameda County to bar the hospital from removing Jahi's
ventilators. While the case was pending, the hospital reached an agreement
with the family that they would allow Jahi's body to be transferred to a
private facility, if the family could find transport and a location that would
13. lan Austen, Brain-Dead, a Canadian Woman Remains a Silent PartnerAwaiting
Birth, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/world/americas/
brain-dead-a-canadian-woman-lives-on-as-a-silent-partner-awaiting-birth.html?_r-0;
Andrea Grimes, In Texas and Canada, Lessons About Who Can-and Should-Make End-ofLife Decisions for Pregnant Persons, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 12, 2014, 2:42 PM),

http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/02/12/texas-canada-lessons-can-make-end-lifedecisions-pregnant-people/.
14. Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 495-96 (2004)
("Posthumous reproduction occurs when a child is born after one or more of the biological

parents have died. Posthumous reproduction by women involves the extracting egg from a

woman while she is alive, fertilizing it with frozen sperm, and subsequently implanting it in

a surrogate after the genetic contributor's death. Posthumous reproduction by men involves
retrieving sperm from a man while alive, freezing it, and using it for fertilization after the
man has died. Posthumous reproduction can also occur when one or both of a stored frozen
embryo's parents dies.").
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accept the body to maintain the "life-sustaining" treatment. However, the
restraining order ruling set a potentially dangerous precedent,
acknowledging for the first time that there may be posthumous parental
rights to a brain dead child.
Although the forgoing individual accounts arose under distinct
circumstances and involved varying relationships with families, hospitals,
and expression of the brain dead individual's interests, there are several
common themes that form the basis for the following discussion. What is
the medical rationale for brain death, and where the line is drawn between
people who are in a coma or people who are dead? There are questions
about who should be making decisions for people who are left in such a
state: should their advance directives be honored, should their families be
empowered to decide about their care, or can the state intervene? Drawing
comparison between three very different countries, this comment seeks to
open a legal dialogue about what rights an individual has against the state
in cases of maternal brain death, and what the implications may be for
assisted reproductive technologies and reproductive rights in the future.
B. WHEN CAN A STATE KEEP A PREGNANT PERSON ON LIFE SUPPORT?
Several scholars have begun to examine these recent cases, which arise
with increasing frequency as medical technology advances. Lawrence 0.
Gostin drew similar parallels from the McMath and Mufioz cases, outlining
the ethical and legal dilemmas raised by a party attempting to fight for
treatment when it is being refused, or to fight for refusal of treatment when
it is being imposed. 5 Gostin drew few conclusions, however, beyond the
likelihood of persisting legal, emotional, and ethical issues surrounding
brain death. Dr. David C. Magnus, et al. also compared the McMath and
Muhioz cases to raise a frightening conclusion about the determination of
death and the rights of families, warning that, "allowing family members to
determine death threaten[s] to undermine decades of law, medicine, and
ethics."l 6 But where do we draw the line? Should a family, such as the
Mufioz family, be able to assert the decedent's wishes to die with dignity?
And if so, should a family like the McMaths be able to assert their own
religious beliefs to contravene medical advice?
Reproductive health and rights commentator Andrea Grimes refers to
the conundrum as one that should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis,
with respect for each individual circumstance, and the belief that "we, as
average citizens, can trust ourselves to make these tough decisions without
heavy-handed direction of black-and-white laws written for very, very gray
15. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Legal and Ethical ResponsibilitiesFollowing Brain Death: The
McMath and Mufioz Cases, JAMA ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2014), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/
article.aspx?articleld=1 818922.
16. David C. Magnus, Benjamin S. Wilfond & Arthur Caplan, Accepting Brain Death,

370:10 NEw ENG. J. MED. 891, 892 (Mar. 6, 2014), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf
/10.1056/NEJMpl400930.
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situations."' 7 Indeed, the occurrence of maternal brain death is rare enough
that such specific situations could perhaps be decided on a case-by-case
basis.' 8 When these "gray situations" enter the courts, however, there must
The historic constitutional bases for
be some standard to apply.
terminating a pregnancy or refusing medical treatment may no longer be
enough, and these rare cases could also have potentially dangerous
precedential effects on such existing rights.
Only thirty cases of maternal brain death were reported between 1982
and 2010, but a 2013 case study from Dr. Said, et al. in the United Arab
Emirates pointed out that instances in medical literature are increasing.
Said reported the case of a thirty-five year old woman who was declared
brain dead while pregnant with a fetus at sixteen weeks gestation, and was
kept on support technology for another sixteen weeks until the fetus was
viable and a successful delivery was made through caesarean section. The
110-day somatic support was one of the longest occurrences to date
worldwide, and led Said, et al. to conclude that the gestational age of the
fetus at brain death "is no longer an important issue . . . with the important
advances in life-support technology and critical care that enables the
20
maintenance of vital functions."
It is this medical determination, particularly in light of recent handling
of brain dead patients, which raises significant concerns for future of
reproductive technology and the corresponding whittling of women's
reproductive autonomy. If medical providers believe that the technology
2
exists to make a dead body a beneficial "natural incubator," ' regardless of
gestational age of the fetus or the family's wishes, we risk losing the ability
to draw the line between active reproduction and passive incubation in the
female body.
C. VEGETATIVE STATE VERSUS BRAIN DEATH, AND DEATH: MEDICAL
STANDARDS AND DEFINITIONS

Brain death is sometimes considered to be one of several disorders of
consciousness, though the spectrum generally includes disorders of those
Disorders of
individuals who are still medically and legally alive.
consciousness, in decreasing order of severity and inactivity, include coma,
vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and the false-positive "lockedin syndrome." 22 Closest to brain death on the spectrum is a coma. "Coma
17. Grimes, In Texas and Canada,supra note 14.
18. Esmaeilzadeh, et al., supra note 5.
19. Said, et al., supra note 1.

20. Said, et al., supra note 1, at 220.
21. Said, et al., supra note 1, at 222.
22. Maxine H. Harrington, Advances in Neuroimaging and the Vegetative State:
Implicationsfor End-of-Life Care, 36 HAMLINE L. REv. 213, 214 (2013) (suggesting that
technological innovations in neuroimaging may allow a patient in a vegetative state to

communicate their wishes for treatment by asking them to think of specific images in
response to yes/no questions, and then monitoring brain activity).
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is a state of unwakefulness (eyes-closed) and unawareness.. . . It is usually
a temporary, acute state that can last days to weeks. Patients may devolve
from coma to brain death, which is defined as the irreversible cessation of
all functions of the brain," 23 or may recover to a vegetative state and then to
full consciousness.
There is confusion and controversy about
differentiation of brain death and vegetative state even in the medical
community, but it is nevertheless generally well settled that a nonreactive
vegetative state is a state of living, while brain death is a diagnosis that
occurs when there is no remaining brain function and is equivalent to
death.24 In either diagnosis, patients may be kept on somatic support
methods until termination of support is deemed appropriate. These support
methods provide the patient with nutritional and ventilator support,
temperature regulation, antibiotics, and other medical interventions to
maintain the body's physicality without the direction of the brain.25
One very relevant legal difference between the two diagnoses is who
makes the decision to terminate support. In the case of a brain dead
patient, "[e]ven many of the most vocal critics of brain death agree that
there is no obligation to continue providing mechanical support after brain
death." 26 A hospital may elect to leave the patient on support for a matter
of days so that the family can say goodbye, though in some cases any
further treatment of the patient may constitute interference with a dead
body, as was the case with Oakland Children's Hospital and Jahi McMath.
For a patient in a vegetative state, on the other hand, doctors must follow
an advance directive as instructed. In the absence of directive, a medical
surrogate, usually a family member or a close friend, is appointed to make
decisions about whether or not to sustain treatment.27
With this
understanding, a hospital's default recommendation for a brain dead patient
might be to remove them from support, while the recommendation for a
vegetative patient might be to leave them on support. The conceptual line
between brain death and coma is slim, 28 and physicians may feel in either
case that they must focus on survival of the fetus.2 9
23. Harrington, supra note 23, at 215.
24. Contra Joseph L. Verheijde, Mohamed Y. Rady, and Joan L. McGregor, Brain Death,
States of Impaired Consciousness, and Physician-Assisted Death for End-of-Life Organ
Donation and Transplantation, 12:409 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHILOS. 421 (2009) (arguing
against brain-based criteria for the determination of death).
25. Said, et al., supra note 1, at 221.
26. Magnus, et al., supra note 17, at 893.
27. Thomas A. Mappes, Persistent Vegetative State, Prospective Thinking, and Advance
Directives, 13:2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 119, 119 (2003).
28. Ari R. Joffe, et al., A Survey of American Neurologists about Brain Death:
Understanding the Conceptual Basis and Diagnostic Tests for Brain Death, 2:4
ANN.INTENSIVE CARE 1, 7 (2012), available at http://www.annalsofintensivecare.com/
content/pdf/2110-5820-2-4.pdf.
29. Esmaeilzadeh, et al., supra note 5, at 1.
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In the U.S., the Uniform Determination of Death Act ("UDDA"),
approved in 1980, sets a standard for physicians to determine death. "An
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards."o Brain
death falls squarely within the second criterion for determination of death,
even if machines may artificially perpetuate the first criterion. The UDDA
was adopted to solidify the concept that loss of integrated physical and
mental function is the earmark of death-beyond, for example, loss only of
respiratory or reactive processes. The UDDA is accepted in its model form
by all fifty U.S. states, though two retain religious exceptions to the
determination of death at the request of the deceased's family.
While medical and legal scholars report that this standard is well
established and well understood in the medical community, quantitative
evidence paints a different, more concerning picture. Ari Joffe, et al.
conducted a 2012 survey of how American neurologists understand brain
death. All doctors should ostensibly have an understanding of brain death
as informed by the UDDA-particularly neurologists, as the specialists
usually declaring brain death in a patient. However, the report concluded
that "most neurologists do not understand . . . the standard concept that
[brain death] is death.. .. "3 In fact, many doctors believed that there was
high potential for false diagnosis of brain death, and there was confusion
about whether brain death actually marks the irreversible cessation of brain
function. Thus, a person's bodily autonomy and exercise of right may rest
on a doctor's personal understanding of brain dead despite clear, uniform
statutory standards for determining death. Even more alarming, however,
were the survey results regarding a hypothetical brain dead pregnant
When offered to select from different stages at which the
patient.
neurologists might declare death in the patient, six percent reported that
they would not consider the patient to be dead until after delivery of the
fetus.33 A similar survey of Canadian neurosurgeons indicated that sixteen
percent would not diagnose brain death before delivery or demise of the
fetus.34 Thus even when legal and medical standards may indicate that a
brain dead pregnant person should be removed from support, some
physicians may allow personal convictions to distort their actions. This
conflation of maternal life or death with fetal "life" may be one conceptual
obstacle to remodeling existing laws and medical standards.
30. Unif. Determination of Death Act § l (2008), also available from THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS at http://www.uniformlaws.org

/shared/docs/determination%200f/2Odeath/udda8O.pdf.
31. Gostin, supra note 16, at *E 1.
32. Joffe, et al., supra note 29 at 5.

33. Id. at *3.
34. Ari R. Joffe, et al., A Survey to Determine the Understandingof the ConceptualBasis
and Diagnostic Tests Used for Brain Death by Neurosurgeons in Canada, 61
NEUROSURGERY 1039, 1044 (2007).
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Several authors draw parallels between brain dead organ donors and
pregnant persons, as one body is being used in part for the survival of
another. For example, Said, et al. draw a very clear conclusion that the
"ethical justification for prolonging the vital functions of the mother can be
supported better if she is a prospective organ donor as the fetus would be
the first to benefit from receiving the organs of the mother." 35 However,
the inconsistency of medical understanding of brain death, coupled with the
relative rarity of maternal brain death, means that there is no standard
protocol for dealing with pregnant brain dead patients.
Medical recommendations regarding treatment of a brain dead pregnant
patient vary widely and include evaluations based on gestational age of the
fetus, evidence of the desires of the mother, ethical obligations of medical
staff, and potential interests of the fetus. Despite these variations, the issue
remains that the fetus should not in most cases be considered the primary
patient of the medical provider.36 A doctor has certain responsibilities to a
pregnant patient, but these duties are extinguished upon death of the
patient, leaving the fetus in medical and legal limbo. 37 There could be
serious implications to abortion rights and the rights of pregnant people if it
is determined that fetuses, even in these limited situations, have protectable
medical interests as patients.
D. Is "NATURAL" INCUBATION THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY?

The advancement of technology in the past ten years has changed the
landscape of reproductive technologies considerably. Medical literature
indicates that gestational age is no longer a concern in determining whether
a pregnant woman should be kept on somatic support until delivery, which
may impact concepts of fetal viability. Many states in the U.S. are
currently pushing to ban abortions as early as twenty weeks, and taking
35. Said, et al., supra note 1, at 222.
36. Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Margaret Olivia Little, and Ruth R. Faden, A Critique of the
'Fetus as Patient', 8(7) AM. J. BIOETH. 42 (2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC2553002/pdf/nihms68449.pdf('"Patienthood' . . . is a normative status
that connotes concrete expectations for professional engagement: physicians are duty-bound
to be fiduciaries of their patients. More specifically, physicians are typically understood as
having a strong, primary, and equal fiduciary duty to their individual patients. This raises
the concern that, insofar as clinicians regard themselves as having two patients-even two
intertwined patients-they may regard their obligations to and the value of each of their
patients as equal. Yet tragically, we face circumstances in the context of pregnancy that
reflect how important it is to recognize the primacy of the clinician's duties to the pregnant
woman.").
37. Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, supra note 15, at 498-99. Sperling cites four
distinct methodologies proposed by physicians: William P. Dillon, et al., Life Support and
Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy, 248 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1098 (1982); Jeffrey
Spike, Brain Death, Pregnancy, and Posthumous Motherhood, 10 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 57
(1999); Nicola S. Peart, et al., Maintaining a Pregnancy Following Loss of Capacity, 8
MED. L. REV. 275 (2000); Stephen Wear, Letter from Stephen Wear & William P. Dillon
and Richard V. Lee, to Editor, 261 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1728 (1989).
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other measures to restrict people from terminating pregnancy as early as
possible. 38 If maternal death is considered similar to abortion as a cause of
fetal "death," then the new technology coupled with the increasing
insistence that a human life exists before fetal viability will create major
obstacles for people seeking to terminate life support of a pregnant brain
dead patient. Indeed, it is this combination that sets the stage for a new
method of reproduction by human incubation.
One area of reproductive technology that has not yet received attention
in comparison to maternal brain death is the concept of surrogate
pregnancy. Some scholars address surrogate motherhood in relation to in
vitro fertilization to effect posthumous parenthood (and certainly all
scholars writing on the topic at hand discuss surrogate decision-makers).
But in the language of reproductive technology, could it be argued that a
brain dead pregnant woman begins to serve the role of a gestational
surrogate mother? If this is the case, what precedent exits to bar the
practice of using brain dead organ donors as gestational surrogates? Since
medical scholars have remarked that the ethical implications of maternal
brain death are seriously lessened when a woman is an identified organ
donor, 3 9 it is not inconceivable that female-bodied organ donors would be
used to gestate the offspring of others as an acceptable technological
advance in the not too distant future.
There are no clear solutions to the issue yet, but as technological
capacity increases it is likely that more such cases will arrive.
Esmaeilzadeh, et al. recommend that an international registry of brain dead
pregnant patients be established so that physicians can access a more
comprehensive database of case studies and practical treatment
recommendations.4 0 Said, et al. recommend discussing the possibility of
brain death in prenatal counseling, and executing a written document with
While the medical
mothers to express their wishes for treatment.41
38. Since 2010, twelve states have implemented bans on abortion at 20 weeks, under the
auspices of "fetal pain" and in direct violation of the Constitutional rights established in
Roe. "[T]hese 20-week bans ignore the question of viability, lack the needed exceptions,
and instead are meant as a direct challenge to the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade."
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, ABORTION BANS AT 20 WEEKS: A DANGEROUS RESTRICTION
FOR WOMEN (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortionbans-at-20-weeks.pdf, see also, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE

(Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
spibs/spibPLTA.pdf. A recent, high-profile federal bill also proposed to ban abortion
outright at or after 20 weeks post-fertilization. The bill stalled in the Senate in September
2015, but highlighted the severity of expanding restrictions on abortion in the U.S. H.R.36
PAIN-CAPABLE UNBORN CHILD PROTECTION ACT, 114th Congress (2015-2016), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 114th-congress/house-bill/36.
-

POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS

39. See, e.g., Esmaeilzadeh et al., supra note 5, at *9; Said, et al., supra note 1, at *4; but,
cf Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, supra note 16, at 470 ("The organ donor model is
inapplicable to the case of a brain-dead pregnant woman.").

40. Esmaeilzadeh, et al., supra note 5, at *10.
41. Said, et al., supra note 1, at 223 (citing Anita J. Catlin & Deborah Volat, When the
Fetus is Alive but the Mother is Not: Critical Care Somatic Support as an Accepted Model
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recommendations address practical tools, there is little agreement regarding
the application of legal standards in these cases. Considering a brain dead
pregnant woman to be dead and refusing to maintain somatic support can
run afoul of state interests in potential life, as well as the wishes of the
family. Keeping such patients on support also illuminates serious issues of
personal and reproductive autonomy, medical decision-making, and state
interest interference. The occurrence of brain death in pregnant women
remains rare enough that perhaps cases are best decided on an individual
basis with deference to the wishes of the family. Nevertheless, increased
technological capacity will likely continue to raise more pressing issues of
posthumous reproduction and "natural" incubation. With that in mind, the
next section of this comment examines some of the legal standards used in
recent cases of maternal brain death, and what existing Constitutional rules
may be applied.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS
A. LEGAL STANDARDS, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, AND THE LACK OF
COHESIVE REGULATION IN THE U.S.

Defining when death occurs sets "a highly significant social boundary.
It determines who is recognized as a person with constitutional rights, who
deserves legal entitlements and benefits, and when last wills and testaments
become effective." 4 2 Although an individual generally ceases to have any
protectable interests at the determination of death, there are some interests
that a person retains posthumously. These include protection from
defamation, continuation of attorney-client privilege, and the execution of
property rights through a last will and testament.43 Analyses of property
rights and fetal interests can be applied to brain death cases, and analogized
to both abortion and reproductive technologies that allow such phenomena
as posthumous reproduction.4 In the Mufioz case, "the state appear[ed] to
be violating two interests: the individual's interest in a dignified death and
burial and the physician's interest in acting ethically by not treating a dead
patient." 45
Fourteen U.S. states currently have laws compelling hospitals to keep a
pregnant person on somatic support, regardless of advance directives or the
families' wishes. 46 Louisiana proposed a bill in April 2014 to be come the
of Care in the Twenty-First Century?, 21 CRIT. CARE NURS. CLIN. N. AM. 267 (2009),
available at http://www.sonoma.edu/users/c/catlin/fetus%20alive%20mother/2Odead.pdf).
42. Magnus, et al., supra note 17, at 894.
43. Alexis Gregorian, Post-Mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology for the
Resolution of Conflicts Over Whether a Brain Dead Pregnant Woman Should be Maintained
on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 401, 403-407 (2009).
44. Sperling, MaternalBrain Death, supra note 15, at 496.

45. Gostin, supra note 16, at *E2.
46. Teddy Wilson, Louisiana Committee Passes Bill Preventing Removal of Mechanical
Support From Pregnant Women, RH REALITY CHECK (Apr. 25, 2014, 12:07 PM),
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fourteenth such state, just weeks after Texas' ruling in the Mufioz case.
Louisiana H.B. 1274 changed an- existing statute defining end-of-life
procedures, to "add more explicit language saying that if a patient is
pregnant and an obstetrician determines the woman's life 'can reasonably
be maintained in such a way as to permit the continuing development and
live birth of the unborn child,' the doctor must use life-sustaining
procedures." 48 The law was passed in June 2014 and included the caveat
that the law "would not interfere with the rights of children, parents, or
49
siblings of the woman to make end of life decisions."
Nearly half of U.S. states also have Natural Death Statutes that include
a pregnancy clause that invalidates advance directives in the case of a
pregnant patient.50 In the wake of the Mufioz case, there have been popular
5
media calls to repeal such "discriminatory" laws. ' There have also been
scathing medical opinions: Dr. Jeffrey L. Ecker, for example, calls such
laws "wrongful usurpation of the rights of individuals - in this case, one
52
Dr. Ecker suggests that
particular class of individuals: women."
support their patients as
and
laws
physicians refuse to uphold such
conscientious objectors.
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/25/louisiana-committee-passes-bill-preventingremoval-mechanical-support-pregnant-women/.
47. Id.
48. Melinda Deslatte, Louisiana Bill Mandates Life Supportfor Pregnant Women Despite
Family Wishes, Associated Press, ALEXANDRIA TOWN TALK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.
thetowntalk.com/viewart/20140424/NEWS0I/140424001/Louisiana-bill-mandates-lifesupport-pregnant-women-despite-family-wishes.
49. Louisiana Law Regarding End of Life Procedures (HB 1274), RH REALITY CHECK,
http://data.rhrealitycheck.org/law/louisiana-law-regarding-end-of-life-procedures-hb- 1274/
(last updated July 8, 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.64.6(D) ("It is the policy of the
state of Louisiana that human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural
death. When interpreting this Part, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve human
life, including the life of an unborn child if the qualified patient is pregnant and an
obstetrician who examines the woman determines that the probable postfertilization age of
the unborn child is twenty or more weeks and the pregnant woman's life can reasonably be
maintained in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the
unborn child, and such determination is communicated to the relevant classes of family
members . . . .").
50. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(E); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(C); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-18-104(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-574; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 39-4510; 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(3); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-48(D); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.625, 311.629(4); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 459.025; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2133.06; OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63, § 3101.8(C); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10; TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 154.07(2). See also Gregorian,supra note 44, at 412 (citing Bretton J. Horttor, A
Survey of Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives, 74 N.D.L. REV. 233, 233-34
(1998)).
51. Katherine Taylor & Lynn Paltrow, It's Time to Repeal State Advance Directive Laws
that Discriminate Against Women, RH REALITY CHECK (Apr. 10, 2014, 5:41 PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/10/time-repeal-state-advance-directive-lawsdiscriminate-women/.
52. Ecker, supra note 2, at 890.
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Few court cases have addressed the Natural Death Statutes, and even
fewer have addressed the specific issue of maternal brain death. Despite
the lack of judicial inquiry, it is well established in the U.S. that individuals
have the constitutional right to dictate their own reproductive choices and
to refuse medical treatment. 5 3 In a 2009 proposed legal methodology for
cases of maternal brain death, University of Virginia Law School J.D.
candidate Alexis Gregorian also drew parallels to cases regarding forced
caesarian section of incapacitated patients, where courts have "explicitly
rejected a balancing test between the mother's interests and the fetus'
interests and heavily emphasized the mother's right to forego medical
treatment." 54 Gregorian argued, however, that in cases of maternal brain
death it is a "legal fiction" to claim that the dead person has persisting
interests. This "fiction" then perpetuates the idea that the dead person has a
continuing right to refuse medical treatment; thus, a court must necessarily
weigh the competing interests of the fetus and of the state against the
fictitious interests of the dead.
Gregorian also used fetal viability as a line of demarcation, much like
those established in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.56 In
her proposed methodology, Gregorian argued that there should be three
different standards for determining what to do in the case of maternal brain
death. First, if the woman dies pre-viability and has an advanced directive
or living will, those choices about life support should be honored.57
Second, if the mother suffers brain death without having clear preferences
outlined, the decision should be made through substituted judgment, where
a surrogate decision-maker is appointed.58 This should be done with the
consensus of the family; or if consensus cannot be reached, the decision
should be made with the assistance of the court, weighing the interests of
the mother, her family, and the biological father. Finally, if the mother
becomes brain dead post-fetal-viability, or at about twenty-nine weeks, the
state's interest in potentiality of life becomes compelling, and should take
more weight than the tenuous interest of the brain dead woman to refuse
treatment.59 Gregorian acknowledged that this would mean changing state
advance directive laws, and that the post-viability line, while in line with
some abortion jurisprudence, does not comport with the cases regarding
forced caesarean section. Nevertheless, the final word in U.S. abortion law
comes from the Casey court, holding that the state's compelling interest in
potential life is controlling. 60
53. Respectively, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
54. Gregorian, supra note 44, at 418 (citing In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C.
1990)).
55. Id. at 419.
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
57. Gregorian, supra note 51, at 419.
58. Id. at 420.
59. Id. at 423.
60. Id.
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James M. Jordan in 1988, Radhika Rao in 2000, and Daniel Sperling
in 2004 also produced scholarship examining the legal issues that arise with
maternal brain death. 6 1 Jordan predicted that there would be an increasing
number of such cases as technological advancements increased and courts
decided more cases about the right to refuse medical treatment. 62 A 1977
Georgia case, University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazza, is an oft-cited
cases of maternal brain death in which a woman was declared brain dead at
sixteen weeks' gestation. While her family and husband wanted her
removed from life support, the biological father of the fetus (not the
husband) challenged the decision.63 The court held that "the privacy rights
of the mother are not a factor in this case because the mother is dead . .
.,64 Analyzing this decision against abortion and right-to-death cases that
controlled at the time, Jordan concluded that this holding is incorrect.
"Brain death does not extinguish the rights of a woman over her body,
because a statutory standard of death cannot arbitrarily limit a fundamental
constitutional right, and because her bodily control also derives from a
posthumous property right in her own cadaver." 65
Professor Radhika Rao also framed the issue as one of both property
and privacy, and concluded that the differences between the theories rather
than the intersections define when one governs. Constitutional privacy
rights and property rights share many similarities, where "[b]oth property
and privacy revolve around

. . .

images of bounded space, of protected

sanctuaries or spheres of decentralized decision-making." 66 Property law
implies ownership of the body (external or internal), while privacy law
requires that the body and its ownership are indivisible.6 7 Rao set out a
three-part inquiry for determining which should apply.
[W]hether the body should be identified as the subject of a privacy
interest or the object of property ownership depends essentially upon (1)
whether it is living or dead; (2) whether it is integrated with the whole
person or a separate part; and (3) whether it is involved in a personal
relationship or an object relationship.68

&

61. James M. Jordan Ill, Note, Incubatingfor the State: The PrecariousAutonomy of
Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV. 1103, 1103
(1988); Rao, supra note 1; Sperling, MaternalBrain Death, supra note 15.
62. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
63. University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Super. Ct. of
Richmond Cty,. Ga., Aug. 4, 1986), available at Order in the Piazzi Case, 2 ISSUES IN L.
MED. 415 (1987), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/UnivrsityHealth-vPiazziGaSup_.1986-.pdf, [hereinafter Order in the Piazzi Case].
64. Order in the Piazzi Case, supra note 64, at 417.
65. Jordan, supra note 62, at 1165.
66. Rao, supra note 1, at 423.
67. Rao, supra note 1, at 444.
68. Id. at 445.
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Applying this framework to a brain dead pregnant person under the
first part of the test, Rao suggested that any autonomy retained after death
"must derive from property rather than privacy. Consequently, the state
may conscript her [pregnant] body for public use as a fetal incubator just as
it may conscript any other form of property." 6 9
Sperling addressed the issue within the frameworks of abortion law,
human tissue law, and posthumous gifts. He declined to extrapolate
abortion law under Roe to cases of maternal brain death, and instead argued
that the alternative "undue burden" test from Casey should be applied. He
also analyzed the issue using Canadian law, explaining that Canadian
courts are reluctant to restrict abortion, and generally confer to a person full
freedom of choice in the early stages of pregnancy. Sperling concluded
that, similar to Gregorian's proposal, early in the pregnancy the woman's
wishes should be respected if known, and determined through a surrogate
process if unknown. Sperling continues to write extensively on the topic,
and remarked in 2008 that, contrary to the frameworks suggested by Jordan
and Rao, there is no property interest in the posthumous body because the
basic tenets of property law require elements of ownership, possession, and
exclusion that are lacking in a deceased body.70
With this background in mind, the following comparison assesses
differing approaches to the rights that underlie maternal brain death cases
in the United States, Canada, and Ireland.. While none of these countries
have cohesive regulations that apply to the relatively rare incidences of
maternal brain death, each has availed itself of the legal and constitutional
frameworks they have previously applied to similar issues. They have
varied conclusions-surprisingly restrictive in the United States' currently
constricting abortion landscape, relatively uncontroversial in Canada's
accommodating reproductive rights arena, and surprisingly respectful of the
mother's bodily autonomy under Ireland's vehemently anti-abortion laws.
1. United States
a. Marlise Mufioz, 33 Years Old, 14 Weeks Pregnant, November
2013 (Texas)
Marlise Mufioz collapsed at home on November 26, 2013. At the time,
she was thirty-three years old and fourteen weeks pregnant. Her husband
Erick Mufioz rushed her to the hospital, but lifesaving efforts were
unsuccessful and Mrs. Mufioz was declared brain dead on November 28,
2013.71 Both of the Mufiozes were trained paramedics, and Mr. Mufioz

69. Rao, supra note 1,452-53.
70.

DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 142

(2008).
71. Defendant's Brief in Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel at 1, Muiioz v. John
Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14 (Tex.Dist. Jan. 24, 2014), 2014 WL 285056
[hereinafter Defendant's Brief|.
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was sure from their personal conversations that his wife would not want to
be left connected to artificial "life support." However, the hospital refused
to remove Mrs. Mufioz from somatic support, citing a section of Texas
Health and Safety Code that prohibits life-sustaining treatment from being
removed when a patient is pregnant.72 Mr. Muiioz filed a motion to compel
the hospital to remove Mrs. Muiioz from somatic support on January 14,
2014.7 The motion argued first that the hospital misinterpreted Health and
Safety Code because Mrs. Muiioz was not a "pregnant patient" - she was
dead and the hospital was in fact desecrating her body; or alternatively that
the hospital was acting in blatant violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
74
rights to privacy and equal protection under the laws.
Citing Texas "state's expressed commitment to the life and health of
unborn children[,]" the hospital responded that legislation was intended to
75
protect a fetus regardless of whether Mrs. Mufioz remained alive.
Furthermore, given the state's interest in protecting life, "it is reasonable to
distinguish between a pregnant patient and a patient who is not pregnant.
The Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the treating two different
classes of terminally ill patients differently."7 6 Judge R.H. Wallace of the
District Court of Texas, 96th Judicial District, disagreed and entered a
judgment on January 24, 2014 ordering the hospital to remove Mrs. Muiioz
from "life-sustaining treatment." 7 7 Judge Wallace concluded succinctly
that "[t]he provisions of § 166.049 of the Texas Health and Safety Code do
78
Judge
not apply to Marlise Mufioz because . . . Mrs. Mufioz is dead."
Wallace declined to rule on its constitutionality because the law did not
apply to Mrs. Mufioz,. By the time the order was granted and Mrs. Mufioz
was removed from somatic support, all parties agreed that the fetus was not
viable.79
b. Maria Lopez, 1999 (California)
Author Daniel Sperling, who has researched maternal brain death
extensively, reported Mrs. Maria Lopez as an additional U.S. case of
maternal brain death. According to Sperling, Mrs. Lopez was declared
72. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 ("A person may not withdraw or
withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a pregnant patient.").
73. Plaintiff s Motion to Compel Defendants to Remove Marlise Mufioz from "Life
Sustaining" Measures and Application for Unopposed Expedited Relief, Mufioz v. John
Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14 (Tex.Dist. Jan. 14, 2014), 2014 WL 285060.
74. Id.
75. Defendant's Brief, supra note 82, at 3-4.
76. Defendant's Brief, supra note 82, at 8.
77. Judgment, Muiioz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
96th Judicial Dist. Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://thaddeuspope.com/images/MUNOZ202053415-Judges-Order-on-Munoz-Matter.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Manny Fernandez, Judge Orders Hospital to Remove Pregnant Woman From Life
Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/us/judge-ordershospital-to-remove-life-support-from-pregnant-woman.html?_r-0.
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brain dead on April 24, 1999, while pregnant with twins. The family
decided not to withdraw "life-support measures" and the twins were later
delivered prematurely via cesarean section. 8
There is little other
information available about Mrs. Lopez, though according to reports from
several anti-abortion or "right to life" news sources, it appears that Mrs.
Lopez was not actually brain dead.8 ' She instead awoke from a coma, and
the babies were delivered while she was conscious. According to a story in
the Los Angeles Times, Mrs. Lopez entered a coma after ruptured brain
vessels resulted in severe hemorrhage; her family was advised to withdraw
life support and agreed to do so, but Mrs. Lopez awoke just as a priest was
performing her last rites. 82 The story of Mrs. Lopez does not actually
involve brain death, but nonetheless highlights the difficulties that medical
and legal practitioners face in determining brain death. She also remains an
example of the agonizing choices that families are faced with, and potential
legal obstacles that arise in determining death.83
c. Courts on Brain Death
There is only one U.S. case that has explicitly addressed the matter of
maternal brain death, in 1986. In University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi,
a Georgia court examined the case of Donna Piazzi, who was declared
brain dead at approximately twenty weeks gestation. 8 4 The hospital and
court admitted that it was likely they could keep Mrs. Piazzi on somatic
support until the fetus reached viability. Mrs. Piazzi's husband Robert
Piazzi wished to have her removed from somatic support. A different man
named David Hadden, who claimed to be the father of the child, wished to
keep Mrs. Piazzi on somatic support in the interest of preserving the fetus,
allegedly his child. The court looked at the issue of whether it was proper
to order continued life support to preserve a fetus. Taking it as a question
of first impression, the court declined to analogize well-settled abortion
law.
80. SPERLING, MANAGEMENT OF POST-MORTEM PREGNANCY, supra note 8, at viii.

81. See Liz Townsend, Twins Born Healthy after Mother Wakes from "Irreversible"
Coma, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org
/news/2013/1 0/twins-bom-healthy-after-mother-wakes-from-irreversiblecoma/#.VVINxJNV
iko; Dave Andrusko, Woman Awakens From Coma to See Newborn Daughter, NAT'L RIGHT
To LIFE COMM. (2001), http://www.nrc.org/archive/news/2001/NRL04/coma.html.
82. Mike Downey, A Recovery That Is Best Explainedas a Miracle, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 30,

1999, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/30/news/mn-61025.
83. For similar discussion of comatose women who have been kept on support until their
children are delivered, see the case of Barbara Blodgett in 1989. Michelle Green, Joni H.
Blackman, & Victoria Balfour, Awakening from a Coma, a Washington Woman Meets Her
Miraculous Baby
Boy,
PEOPLE
MAG.,
Feb.
27,
1989,
available at

http://www.people.com/people /archive/article/0,,20119654,00.html.
Another case arose
recently in 2015, when Sharista Giles' baby was delivered prematurely while she was in a
coma. Sydney Lupkin, Sharista Giles: Mom Wakes Up From Coma to Find She's Had Her
Baby, ABC NEWS, Apr. 9, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/mom-wakes-coma-find-

shes-baby/story?Id=30193953.
84. Order in the Piazzi Case, supra note 64.
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The law is settled that prior to viability the mother may decide to abort
a fetus, ... and that after viability the state can both prohibit abortions and
require that the mother undergo necessary treatment to protect the life of
the fetus. . . . These well-settled principles of law do not apply here
because the mother is brain dead and the fetus is not yet viable.8
Citing Georgia's feticide law, court determinations of the state's
interest in fetal life, and laws that negate advance directives of a pregnant
woman, the court concluded "that so long as there exists a reasonable
possibility that a non-viable fetus can develop and survive with the
maintenance life support systems for its brain dead mother, then those life
86
support systems must be maintained."
Courts have not yet established a common understanding of brain
death generally, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the
matter of a brain dead patient. In the influential Cruzan case, discussed in
further detail below, the dissent highlighted the difference between a
persistent vegetative state and brain death, noting that in a comatose patient
"[a]n erroneous decision to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration, to
be sure, will lead to failure of that last remnant of physiological life, the
7
This lack of uniform
brain stem, and result in complete brain death."4
understanding.
medical
conventional
mirrors
understanding unfortunately
According to Joffe's 2012 survey of American neurologists, although
"[a]lmost half accept [brain death] because it is a state of permanent
unconsciousness, . . . more than half do not consider it equivalent to
There is a broad disparity among neurologists'
circulatory death." 8
understanding of brain death and the subsequent treatment of a brain dead
patient, despite the UDDA. 89
d. Constitutional Provisions
There is no explicit constitutional right in the U.S. to abortion, health
care, or death with dignity. These rights, however, are interpreted to exist
primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In the
seminal abortion case Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the "right
of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . [or] in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
85. Order in the Piazzi Case, supra note 44, at 417 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981)).
86. Id. at 418.
87. Cruzan v. Mo.Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 320 (1990) (Brennan, J., with whom
Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J. join, dissenting).
88. Ari R. Joffe, et al., A Survey of American Neurologists about Brain Death:
Understanding the Conceptual Basis and Diagnostic Tests for Brain Death, 2:4
ANN.INTENSIVE CARE

1, 7 (2012), available at http://www.annalsofintensivecare.coml

content/pdf/2110-5820-2-4.pdf.
89. See discussion and accompanying text, supra note 37.
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pregnancy." 90 As discussed below, the right of privacy has also been
extended to include the right to refuse lifesaving healthcare. It is suggested
that these matters exist in established property rights. 91
e. Abortion Laws
Roe v. Wade established a constitutional right to abortion in 1972. The
U.S. Supreme Court "conclude[d] that the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation." 92 To
assess the interplay of state interests, Roe established a trimester
framework. The framework can be broken down as follows: in the first
trimester of pregnancy the pregnant woman's interests take precedence and
no restrictions may be imposed; in the second trimester the decision to have
an abortion may be regulated by the state using measures reasonably
related to maternal health; and in the third trimester, the state's interest
takes precedence and abortion may be regulated or prevented "except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother."93
This framework was amended in 1992, when the Court in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey affirmed Roe's central holding but imposed an "undue
burden" test to replace the trimester framework. 94 After rejecting the
trimester framework, the Court reasoned that "[t]o protect the central right
recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the same time accommodating the
State's profound interest in potential life, we will employ the undue burden
analysis . . . ."95 The undue burden standard, however, remains open to
broad interpretation. The Court explained only that "[a]n undue burden
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is
to place a substantialobstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability." 9
Courts continue to examine the
question of what constitutes a "substantial obstacle" to abortion care that is
sufficient to impose an undue burden. 97 States remain able to implement
90. Roev. Wade,410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
91. See discussion and accompanying text, supra note 72.
92. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-165.
94. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) ("The trimester
framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the woman's right to choose not become so
subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but
not in fact. We do not agree, however, that the trimester approach is necessary to
accomplish this objective. A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later
interpretation sometimes contradicted the State's permissible exercise of its powers....
We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential
holding of Roe.").
95. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (emphasis added).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. At the time this article went to print, the case Whole Woman's Health v. Cole was
pending review before the U.S. Supreme Court. The case, if accepted, is poised to "produce
the most important abortion ruling since 1992 . . . ." Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Prepares
to Take On Politically Charged Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2015, at A13, available at
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their own regulations on abortion under the auspices of ensuring maternal
health.98 While there is a constitutional right to abortion, it is increasingly
controversial in the United States. These restrictive attitudes are rooted in
conservative beliefs that a fetus is a full human life at the moment of
conception-the same attitudes that inform opposition to removing a brain
dead pregnant person from somatic support.
f. Right to Refuse Health Care
There is a Constitutional right to refuse heath care in the U.S. While it
is not explicit, the Supreme Court has interpreted that it is included in
Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights. "The principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
99
The
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."
but
wishes,
individual's
an
to
relative
right
this
upheld
has
Supreme Court
v.
Cruzan
In
family.
immediate
of
the
wishes
to
it
extend
to
has declined
Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court entertained arguments
about whether a hospital must be forced to comply with the family's wishes
to remove a woman from life support. Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent
vegetative state after a car accident, but the hospital refused to remove her
from life support without a court order, absent clear evidence of Ms.
Cruzan's own wishes. The Court concluded that the hospital could
consider the family's wishes, but did not have to absent compelling
It is thus established that a
evidence of Ms. Cruzan's own wishes. 00
person has a right to refuse medical treatment and end of life care.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/us/politics/supreme-court-prepares-to-take-onpolitically-charged-cases.html?_r-=0. See Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563
(5th Cir.) modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015) (addressing whether or not Texas created
undue burdens on abortion access by requiring that abortion clinics have admitting
privileges at local hospitals, and that clinics meet the same standards as ambulatory surgical
centers).
98. State initiatives referred to as TRAP laws are the primary method of restriction,
occurring with increasing frequency across the country. In the wake of unsuccessful
attempts to explicitly limit abortion access, targeted regulation of abortion providers
("TRAP" laws) attack the procedure through secondary methods including restricted
funding, and clinic operating and facilities requirements.

See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,

STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS (Oct. 1, 2015),

http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-TRAP.pdf.
99. Cruzan v. Mo.Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (citing Jacobson v. Mass.,
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222 (1990)).
100. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87 (1990) ("we do not think the Due Process Clause requires
the State to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself. Close
family members may have a strong feeling-a feeling not at all ignoble or unworthy, but not
entirely disinterested, either-that they do not wish to witness the continuation of the life of

a loved one which they regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading. But there is
no automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be the same
as the patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation

while competent. All of the reasons previously discussed for allowing Missouri to require
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes lead us to conclude that the State may
choose to defer only to those wishes, rather than confide the decision to close family
members.").
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We can also draw comparison from cases of forced caesarean section.
In the case of In re A. C, a Washington, D.C. appeals court held that a
pregnant patient should nearly always have the final say in whether or not a
caesarean section is performed, and that incompetent patients "have just as
much right as competent patients to have their decisions made while
0 Belgian
competent respected."o'
Professor Christophe Lemmens asserts
that generally no state interest outweighs the treatment refusal of a
competent adult, even in the case of a pregnant patient.1 0 2 However, in the
case of advance directives, Lemmens points out that while it may be
binding for a woman to refuse treatment if pregnant and incapacitated, it is
not enforceable for a woman to request to be maintained on life support.
Regardless of a patient's wishes, a physician is never obligated to engage in
treatment that is not medically indicated.1 0 3 This standard again raises the
comparison between the Mufioz and McMath cases, where one family was
asserting the right to refuse treatment, and the other attempting to assert a
right to enforce treatment. 104 The latter case is not legally supported, no
matter how compelling the family story may be.
Determination of a brain dead (or comatose) patient's wishes remains a
point of strong contention. Laws like the Texas provision at issue in Mrs.
Munoz's case are surprisingly more common than one might expect. More
than thirty states have laws on the books that invalidate a living will or the
wishes of a guardian decision-maker if a woman is pregnant but rendered
intellectually incapacitated. 05 These statutes either indirectly remove
decision-making power by declaring advance directives invalid in case of
pregnancy (California is an example), or explicitly mandate that treatment
of the pregnant woman be continued (like in Texas).1 06 Professor Rao
argues that because these laws treat women's bodies as property, it is more
appropriate to invoke property laws in the case of maternal brain death than
the traditional privacy rights usually associated with choice in
pregnancy. 0 7 Other scholars have similarly evoked property analyses in
hypothetical circumstances of maternal brain death, but they have never

101. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990).
102. Christophe Lemmens, End of Life Decisions and Pregnant Women: Do Pregnant
Women Have the Right to Refuse Life PreservingMedical Treatment? A ComparativeStudy,
17 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 485-486 (2010).
103. Id. at 500.
104. See discussion and accompanying text, supra note 16.
105. Rao, supra note 1, at 409.
106. Id. at 411-12.
107. Id. at 452 ("[T]he brain-dead pregnant woman ...
has crossed the legal boundary
separating life from death, and thus receives precisely the same treatment under law as a
corpse. If she continues to possess some degree of autonomy over her body after death, that
autonomy must derive from property rather than privacy.").
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been tested in courts.' 08 Property rights are in fact some of the few rights
that unambiguously remain attached to a person: people may indicate what
is done with their remains and property, and these declarations remain valid
after death.1 09
g. Death With Dignity Laws
The right to die was entertained by the Supreme Court in Cruzan,
though there is no definitively established constitutional right to death with
dignity. States regulate end of life care and assisted death on an individual
basis. In Washington state, for example, there are laws that allow assisted
suicide. The Washington Death With Dignity Act, effective in 2009,
"allows terminally ill adults seeking to end their life to request lethal doses
of medication from medical and osteopathic physicians. These terminally
ill patients must be Washington residents who have less than six months to
live.""o In California, the End-of-Life Option Act passed in October 2015,
amending the California Health and Safety Code to allow that "[a]n
individual who is an adult with the capacity to make medical decisions and
with a terminal disease may make a request to receive a prescription for an
aid-in-dying drug if all [four enumerated] conditions are satisfied.""'
End-of life decisions have long been intertwined with "choice" politics
and anti-abortion initiatives. The famous case of Terri Schiavo brought
these issues to public attention in the late 1990s, when a New Jersey
woman was in an irreversible persistent vegetative state, and her parents
sought to keep her on somatic support while her husband wished to have
her removed. The parents of Schiavo challenged a court order to remove
the feeding tubes, going so far as to incite state legislation, and eventually
Congressional action."'
h. Organ Donation
Another comparator in cases of maternal brain death is the treatment of
organ donation. Medical professionals recently drew an explicit parallel
between maternal brain death and organ donation, commenting that in

108. See Alexis Gregorian, Post-Mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology for the
Resolution of Conflicts Over Whether a Brain DeadPregnant Woman Should be Maintained
on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 401, 403-407 (2009); Sperling,
Maternal Brain Death, supra note 15, at 496.
109. See generally, SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS, supra note 71.

110. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.010 et seq.
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2 (as amended by S.B. 128, 2015 Cal. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2015))..
112. See George J. Annas, "Culture of Life" Politics at the Bedside-The Case of Terri
Schiavo, 352 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1710, 1711-13 (2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, (1 Ith Cir. 2005) ("Parents of incapacitated patient whose artificial
life support had been removed pursuant to Florida court order brought action for alleged
violation of patient's rights with respect to withholding of food, fluids, or medical
treatment.").
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cases of maternal brain death "ethical justification for prolonging the vital
functions of the mother can be supported better if she is a prospective organ
donor as the fetus would be the first to benefit from receiving the organs of
the mother."" 3 In the U.S., organ donation is governed by the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"). If a pregnant woman is declared brain
dead and the use of her uterus is to be evaluated as an organ donation,
specific provisions of the UAGA apply regarding such a donation.
Importantly, and in direct contrast to the legal disputes that we have seen
over maternal brain death, the UAGA outlines ways that a person may
agree to or refuse organ donation, and "in the absence of an express,
contrary indication by the individual set forth in the refusal, an individual's
unrevoked refusal to make an anatomical gift of the individual's body or
part bars all other persons from making an anatomical gift of the
individual's body or part."I1 4 If the UAGA applied to cases of maternal
brain death, hospitals would be required to acknowledge a woman's
advance directive indicating that she does not want to be kept on life
support or make organ donations, even if she were pregnant.
Adopted in 1968 and promulgated by all fifty states, the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act governs what type of anatomical donations may be
made posthumously, and thus grants some individuals agency over what is
to be done with their remains." 5 A person may make a gift of their entire
body, ostensibly implying that a woman's body could be donated for use as
an incubator. Additionally, the Federal Drug Administration oversees
regulation of the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"), a law that
prohibits exchange of money for donated body parts." 6 If NOTA and the
UAGA applied to the use of a donated uterus, it begins to sound like a
gestational surrogacy arranged with living woman, where the process must
be contracted for and funds may not be exchanged.
Each U.S. state also has laws that prohibit interference with a cadaver.
Texas makes it a criminal misdemeanor to dissect or damage any whole or
part of a corpse." 7 In California, it is a felony to mutilate a dead body, and
a misdemeanor to fail to release remains."' In the McMath case, the
physicians at Oakland Children's Hospital refused to insert the feeding

113. Said et al., supra note 1, at *4.
114.

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT

§

7 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2006).

115. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 1987, Refs & Annos (2003), also available from THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.uniform

laws.org/shared/docs/anatomical-gift/uaga-final-aug09.pdf.
116. John J. Zodrow, The Commodification of Human Body Parts: Regulating the Tissue
Bank Industry, 32 Sw. U. L. REv. 407, 408-09 (2003).
117. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.08(a)(1) (2005).
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052(a) (2007) (Unlawful mutilation, disinterment,
or act of sexual penetration or sexual contact with human remains; felony; definitions); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7053 (2007) (Detention or attachment of human remains for

debt; failure to release human remains, personal effects, or certificate required under
Division 102; misdemeanor).
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tubes that would have been required to transport the body to a private
facility, maintaining that the hospital was legally and ethically prohibited
from operating on a dead body.1 19 While California statute clearly defines
a brain dead person as dead, McMath's family attorney argued that she
deserved Constitutional protection as a disabled person, as well as asserted
the family's Constitutional privacy right to make medical decisions for
their own child.1 20 The case highlights the difficulties posed in accepting
brain death as true death, especially when faced with a body that appears to
exhibit signs of life when supported by medical technology.
Texas statutes further complicate the issue when considering the
relatively recent "futility" provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act.
Under an uncommon provision of the Act-the same Act that kept
physicians from removing Marlise Mufioz from life support due to her
pregnancy-physicians are empowered to refuse life saving medical
treatments even to those who request them. "This law applies to everyone
who finds themselves in need of medical assistance to maintain one's life,
even outpatients in need of such things as dialysis or portable respirators,
1
and regardless of whether one's condition is expected to improve." 21
Texas physicians would have been well within their explicit statutory rights
to refuse treatment to Jahi McMath, or even to Robyn Benson. Would they
have done the same for Marlise Mufioz had she not been pregnant? Or
perhaps if the family had wished to keep her body on "life support" after
delivery of the baby, physicians could have refused to take such futile
measures? Comparison of provisions of this Texas statute alone makes it
clear that to the state, Mufioz's value was related only to the fetus that she
carried, regardless of its viability, and not related to the life choices that she
and her husband had hoped to make.
2. Canada
a. Robyn Benson, 32 Years Old, 22 Weeks Pregnant, December
2013 (Victoria, B.C.)
Robyn Benson was thirty-two years old and twenty-two weeks
pregnant when she collapsed from an apparent brain hemorrhage in
December 2013, and was declared brain dead at a Victoria hospital shortly
thereafter.1 2 2 Mrs. Benson's case falls in stark contrast to the case of
119. Matthias Gafni & Natalie Neysa Alund, Jahi McMath: Hospital Open to Transferring
Brain-Dead Teen but Won't Perform Surgery Required by Admitting Facilities, SAN JOSE
http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking2013,
27,
Dec.
NEWS,
MERCURY

news/ci_24805440/jahi-mcmath-hospital-open-transferring-brain-dead-teen.

120. Mattias Gafni, Jahi McMath: Could her case change how California determines
AM),
12:01
2014,
25,
(Jan.
NEWS
MERCURY
JOSE
SAN
death?,

http://www.mercurynews.com/ci-24993245/jahi-mcmath-could-her-case-change-howcalifornia.
121. Nora O'Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility
Provisionof the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 527, 529 (2008).
122. Grimes, In Texas and Canada,supra note 14.
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Marlise Mufioz, playing out simultaneously in the neighboring United
States. Importantly, Mrs. Benson's fetus was on the cusp of viability.
Additionally, her family did not contest any laws or treatment: her husband
Dylan Benson asked that she be kept on somatic support until the baby was
delivered. Baby Iver Benson was successfully delivered by cesarean
section at twenty-eight weeks gestation, and Mrs. Benson was subsequently
removed from somatic support. While the case drew little controversy in
comparison to Mrs. Muiioz, it nevertheless raised questions of how such
cases should be treated.
It also illustrates the persistent, common
misunderstanding of brain death: shortly after Mrs. Benson was removed
from somatic support, a reputable news outlet reported that the dead
woman had "died."1 23
The perspective of the husband, and the treatment by media, closely
mirror another Canadian case from more than a decade earlier.
b. Sophia Park, 25 Years Old, 10 Weeks Pregnant, 1999 (Toronto)
Sophia Park was declared brain dead in Toronto Western Hospital on
November 27, 1999. After several misdiagnoses of tuberculosis, she
slipped into a coma resulting from tuberculous meningitis.1 24 At the time
of the diagnosis, Ms. Park was twenty-five years old and ten weeks
pregnant with her first child.1 25 Doctors recommended removing somatic
support. Ms. Park's husband Paul Shin vehemently disagreed, and took to
popular media in the hopes of compelling the hospital to keep his wife on
somatic support until the baby could be delivered.1 2 6 The media obliged,
and several articles ran calling for the continued support of Ms. Park. The
media, however, frequently conflated brain death with coma, even going so
far as to refer to a 'brain death' coma" as a medical state.1 2 7 As discussed
previously, brain death and coma are very distinct.' 2 8 Ms. Park's family
was devoutly religious, and believed that keeping the baby alive was in
123. Paula Newton, Brain-DeadCanadian Woman Dies After Son's Birth, CNN (Feb. 12,
2014, 7:32 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/1 l/health/canada-brain-dead-pregnantwoman/.
124. Edward C.W. Leung, In the Media: Family of 10 Weeks' Pregnant Brain Dead
Woman Wants to Keep Her Body Alive for Fetus, 77:2 U. TORONTO MED. J. 122 (Mar.
2000), available at http://utmj.org/archive/77-2/NV-Media.pdf, Martha Crean, The
Questions Live On, DE VEBER INST. BIOETHICS & SOCIAL RES. NEWS.: PERSPECTIVES, Spring
2000, http://www.deveber.org/newsletters/spring2000.html.
125. Jonathon Gatehouse, Family Fights to Save Foetus: PregnantMother Misdiagnosed,
Now in IrreversibleComa, NAT'L POST (Toronto), Dec. 2, 1999, at Al.

126. Crean, supra note 125.
127. Jonathon Gatehouse, Don't Give Up, Says Woman Who Gave Birth While in Coma:
Hope for Toronto Family, NAT'L POST (Toronto), Dec. 3, 1999, at A2 (comparing a U.S.

case, where Washington state resident "Mrs. [Barbara] Blodgett was thrown from a Jeep in a
June, 1988, accident and suffered severe head injuries. Three months pregnant at the time,

the then 24-year-old slipped into a deep coma, and doctors told her family that she was in a
state of 'cerebral death.' That December, while still in a coma, she gave birth to a healthy
baby boy. After the birth she regained consciousness.").
128. See discussion and accompanying text, supra note 25.
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God's plan; the media reflected this belief by reporting on the fact that Ms.
Park's fetus was still "alive," even though she was not. While the hospital
29
the fetus was
provided Ms. Park with the "best care possible,"'1
ethicist
medical
A
1999.130
3,
determined to be non-viable on December
noted at the time that "[al]though the hospital has no legal obligation
towards the foetus, which may or may not be medically viable, many
people will believe that it has a moral one . . . ."'31
c. Courts on Brain Death
Canadian courts have applied inconsistent measures for brain death.
This is unsurprising, given that there is also inconsistent understanding in
the medical community. A 2007 study of Canadian neurosurgeons'
understandings of brain death concluded that, "a stand-alone concept of
[brain death] may not exist." 32 Relevant to the current discussion and
perhaps quite tellingly,
When faced with a pregnant brain dead patient, 16% of respondents did
not feel comfortable diagnosing death before the neonate was delivered.
When faced with a family that insists on continued support of a brain dead
patient, 31% would continue this life support to honor the family's wishes.
If similar support would not be continued on a patient after circulatory
3
death, this suggests that BD is thought to be different from death.' 1
Canadian court decisions highlight a line of reasoning that similarly
applies different standards of brain death in different contexts. The British
Columbia Supreme Court reasoned that the standard should apply
differently in civil court and criminal court, since civil court is more
concerned with the people's morality.
The suggestion that brain death or the irreversible cessation of brain
function be the legal standard for determining when death occurs may be
suitable in the medical context and even in the civil law context, but . . . it
34
is a completely impractical standard to apply in the criminal law.'
In an Ontario case, the court referred to brain death as a temporary
state, citing "evidence that [a witness] had suffered memory problems after
a medical incident in the eighties which left her brain dead for a number of

129. Gatehouse, supra note 126.
130. Jonathon Gatehouse, Death of Comatose Woman's Foetus a 'Double Tragedy,'
NAT'L POST (Toronto), Dec. 4, 1999, at A4.
131. Gatehouse, supra note 126 (quoting Dr. Margaret Somerville, founding director of

McGill University's Centre for Ethics and Law).
132. Ari R. Joffe, et al., A Survey to Determine the Understanding of the Conceptual Basis
and Diagnostic Tests Used for Brain Death by Neurosurgeons in Canada, 61
NEUROSURGERY 1039, 1044 (2007).

133. Id.
134. R. v. Green, 1988 CarswellBC 927, T 8 (Can. S.C.B.C.) (WL) (rejecting a murder
defense that the victim was brain dead and thus already dead when the defendant shot him
twice).
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minutes."' 35
In an Ontario arbitration for wrongful employment
termination, the court referenced the cavalier manner in which the term
"brain dead" is often used, allowing that in some contexts "[t]he use of the
phrase 'brain dead' is a schoolyard term and certainly does not link the
grievor to any comments made by a member of the hospital staff."l 3 6
Finally, illustrating a perception of a distinct difference between brain
death and death, a Saskatchewan court detailed how a woman suffered
from a dramatic hemorrhage after childbirth and the expulsion of her
uterus, resulting first in brain death and then death some minutes later.1 37
These decisions highlight the lack of cohesive guidance on brain death, in
both the legal and medical communities.
d. Constitutional Provisions
Canadian cases of matemal brain death appear to have been less
contentious than U.S. cases, which may have to do with attitudes about
abortion and end of life care generally. Most of rights to abortion or health
care in Canada are grounded in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter, which
specifies that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice." 1 3 8 Fundamental freedoms are
enumerated in Section 2, declaring that "Everyone has the following
fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom
of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association."' 39 Finally, Canada also has a clause similar to
the U.S. Equal Protection clause: Section 15 of the Charter reads, "Every
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." 40

135. R. v. Ross, 1997 CarswellOnt 4499, ¶ 55 (Can. O.J.) (WL) (discrediting a witness in
application to stay proceedings for a nearly 20 year delay in prosecuting
defendant/applicant's violations as a psychologist in a youth home).
136. York University and York University and United Plant Guard Workers of America,
Local 1962, Re, 1989 CarswellOnt 4253, ¶ 66 (Can. O.A.) (WL) (a university security
officer was terminated for misrepresenting himself to the family of an ailing colleague, and
among other offenses told university administrators that the ailing man in question was
"brain dead").
137. Naeth Estate v. Warburton, 1992 CarswellSask 162, ¶ 12 (Can. S.C.Q.B.) (WL).
138. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, 1982, c. II (U.K.) (hereafter "Canadian
Charter").
139. Canadian Charter § 2.
140. Canadian Charter § 15.
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e. Abortion Laws
At the time of Ms. Park's death, one author noted concisely that
"[1]egally, in Canada, there is no obligation to save the life of a fetus. Laws
protecting fetal life were erased when the laws limiting abortion were
struck down 10 years ago, and the law remains mute regarding the first
nine months of human life."'41 Canada affords no explicit constitutional
right to abortion but implements few obstacles to people who seek
abortion.1 4 2 Abortion was decriminalized in Canada through a case brought
before the Canadian Supreme Court by Dr. Henry Morgentaler in 1988.143
The Morgentaler case removed prior criminal penalties against abortion
providers, and established that under Morgentaler and the Canada Health
Act, a person should have unrestricted access to abortion care. The Court
also allowed that indigent women should have equal access to abortion, so
state-funded medical programs would cover the cost. The Canada Health
Act requires insurance coverage of medically necessary procedures,
defined only in that "medically necessary is that which is physician
performed," and interpreted in many forums to mean that abortion is indeed
medically necessary and covered.1 44 The effect is that while there is no
"right" to abortion in Canada, there is nevertheless ostensibly
unencumbered access.1 4 5
f. Right to Refuse Health Care
The Canadian Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether or not there is
a right to refuse health care, but at least one scholar confidently concludes
an analysis that "[S]ection 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees a right to refuse non-consensual care . . . .146

While courts

have also not explicitly said that there is a right to receive health care, over
47
the past decade they have appeared to become more open to the idea.1
141. Crean, supra note 125.
142. See Sonya Rahders, Global Abortion Law, History, and Practice: A Summary of
Twenty-One Countries, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW (J. Douglas Butler & David
F. Walbert eds., 6th ed.) (forthcoming 2015).
143. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] I S.C.R. 30 (Can.); United Nations Population Division,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Canada, in ABORTION POLICIES: A GLOBAL
REVIEW 8 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/
doc/canadal.doc.
144. See ABORTION RIGHTS COALITION OF CANADA, POSITION PAPER #1: ABORTION IS A
"MEDICALLY REQUIRED" SERVICE AND CANNOT BE DELISTED (2011), http://www.arcccdac.ca/postionpapers/0 I -Abortion-Medically-Required.pdf.
145. Though while Morgentaler decriminalized abortion and authorized state funding, the
reality remains that access differs widely across Canadian provinces. See Radhika Rao,
Abortion Rights, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73, 85 (Vikram David
Amar & Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2009).
146. Martha Jackman, The Implications of Section 7 of the Charter for Health Care
Spending in Canada, Discussion PaperNo. 31, COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE
IN CANADA

(2002), available at http://www.socialrightscura.ca/documents/publications/

mjackman_3 IJackmanE.pdf
147. Id.
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g. Death With Dignity Laws
As of February 2015, Canada has legalized physician-assisted suicide,
stemming from a court case that explicitly ruled on the right to death with
dignity. 14 8 In Carter v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court held that
sections of the criminal code prohibiting physician-assisted suicide were
unconstitutional. 149
Section 241 (b) and s. 14 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringe s.
7 of the Charter and are of no force or effect to the extent that they prohibit
physician- assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly
consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable
medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes
enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances
of his or her condition.' 50
h. Organ Donation
Organ donation is common in Canada, though it is regulated differently
in each province.' 5 ' According to the Public Health Agency of Canada,
[b]ecause most organ donors in Canada are patients who have been
declared brain dead, the process and procedure for determining death of the
individual based on neurological or brain-based criteria has key
implications for organ donations. Work of the CCDT and CBS has
contributed to developing and supporting the implementation of leading
practice guidelines on the neurological determination of death.1 5 2
In most Canadian provinces there is a Human Tissue Gift Act that
governs organ donation. 53 It is relatively easy for a person to consent, and
certain provisions are made for how consent or lack thereof is treated in
case of mental incapacity. If a person hasn't consented, "or in the opinion
of a physician is incapable of giving a consent by reason of injury or
disease and his death is imminent, the statute in Alberta, for example,
authorizes the patient's next-of-kin to consent on his or her behalf for the
same purposes." l54 In Canada, permissible donor tissue is classified more

148. See Canada Legalizes Physician-AssistedDying,
LIVING WITH DYING

DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT'L CTR:

(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.deathwithdignity.org/2015/02/06/canada-

legalizes-physician-assisted-dying.
149. Carter v. Canada, [2015] S.C.R. 5 (Can.), available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/sccesc/scc-csc/en/item/14637/index.do.
150. Id.
151. Daniel Sperling, MaternalBrain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 466-467 (2004).
152. Evaluation Directorate, Evaluation of Canadian Blood Services Grant and
Contribution Programs 2008-2009 to 2012-2013, HEALTH CANADA AND PUBLIC HEALTH
AGENCY OF CANADA 31, n. 65 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-

asc/alt formats/pdf/perform ance/eval/cbsc-evaluation-pssb-eng.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Human Tissue and Organ Donation Act, SA 2006, c H-14.5 (Alta.)
availableat https://www.canlii.org/en/ab/laws/stat/sa-2006-c-h-1 4 .5/latest/sa-2006-c-h-14.5
.html.
154. Sperling, MaternalBrain Death, supra note 152, at 466.
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narrowly than in the U.S. In many provinces, "tissue" includes organs but
does not include blood or skin or any other regenerable material. In at least
three provinces, tissue is explicitly defined not to include reproductive cells
including "spermatozoa, an ovum, an embryo, a foetus, blood or blood
constituents." 55
However, after examining several means to classify maternal brain
death, including organ donation regulations in the U.S., Canada, and the
U.K., author Daniel Sperling concludes unequivocally that organ donation
models cannot be appropriately employed in cases of maternal brain death.
Organ donations are intended "to promote the welfare of an existing human
being . . . . Its first and foremost aim is to save the life of the sick. In our
situation, the fetus is not 'sick' nor does it enjoy any moral status similar to
an existing human being."
3. Ireland
a. N.P., 26 Years Old, 15 Weeks Pregnant, December 2014

(Dublin)
In late 2014, a twenty-six year old Irish woman, N.P., was declared
brain dead. She was a mother of two and fifteen weeks pregnant. Despite
the wishes of her family, she was kept on somatic support until the fetus
was deemed non-viable. In P.P. v. Health Service Executive, N.P.'s father
sued to have her and her family's wishes honored, by removing her from
somatic support.' 57 By November 29, 2014, hospital staff informed P.P
that his daughter had died. "All had agreed that the life-support machine
should be turned off, because his daughter was dead and the chances of the
unborn child surviving were minimal. He wanted her to have a dignified
death and be put to rest."' 5 8 The court heard from several experts,
including medical professionals who had conducted studies on maternal
brain death illustrating very low survival rates of the fetuses, and health
care-givers who described the distressing and demeaning conditions in
which N.P.'s body was being kept. Distress caused to the mother (or in this
59
case the mother's body) is often imputable to the fetus, as well,' and no
one testified that they believed the fetus would survive. N.P. had no
advance directive, and the court believed that she would not have sought an
abortion and would indeed have "fought long and hard to bring her unborn

155. Id. at 467 (citing Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, R.S.O., ch. H-20, § 1 (1990)
(Can.) (defining "tissue")).
156. Id. at 470.
157. P.P. v. Health Service Executive, [2014] I.E.H.C. 622 (Ir.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2014/H622.html.
158. Id.
159. Id. ("in addition to the ongoing trauma and suffering experienced by the family and
partner of N.P. through the continuance of somatic support, such continuing support will
cause distress to the unborn child in circumstances where it has no genuine prospect of
being bom alive.").
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child to term.".160 Nevertheless, the court was satisfied with the evidence
that there was no chance the fetus could become a live baby, and concluded
that an order to remove N.P. from somatic support was not inconsistent
with the country's interests in preserving unborn life. "Given that the
unborn in this jurisdiction enjoys and has the constitutional guarantee of a
right to life, the court is satisfied that a necessary part of vindicating that
right is to enquire as to the practicality and utility of continuing life support
measures." 1 61
b. Unnamed Woman, 14 weeks, May 2001
The N.P. case also resurrects discussion of a woman in 2001 who faced
a similar fate, though few details of her specific case are available. A
British citizen in Ireland collapsed from a brain hemorrhage at fourteen
weeks pregnant. Given the strict Irish rules about preservation of a fetus,
the hospital was unsure of what life-preserving measures should be taken.
The woman was only removed from somatic support after the fetus was
determined non-viable, two weeks after her collapse.' 62 Medico-legal
ethicists concluded in its wake that even in cases of brain death if there was
a chance of fetal viability then the hospital has an obligation to continue
support. They reasoned that, "once a medical practitioner in Ireland treats
a pregnant patient, he/she is in fact treating two separate entities. If one of
those entities dies, the doctor's duty to the other remains. What must then
be judged is whether the treatment is in the best interests of that other
entity."' 63 However, the Attorney General refused to take a case on the
matter since there was no realistic chance that the fetus would have become
a live baby, and "withdrawal of ventilation, nutrition and fluids would not
require legal sanction given that the likelihood of successful foetal outcome
was considered to be remote." 64
c. Courts on Brain Death
In 1995 one Irish case, In the Matter of a Ward of Court, examined the

removal of life support for a woman in an "almost persistent vegetative
state." 65 The High Court concluded that they should "approach such cases
from the standpoint of 'a prudent, good and loving parent in deciding what
course should be adopted."'l 66 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with
the parenspatriaerole of the courts, and though they did not use the same
"prudent parent" standard they nonetheless reached the conclusion that the
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. A.A. Shiekh & D.A. Cusack, MaternalBrain Death, Pregnancy and the Foetus: The
Medico-Legal Implicationsfor Ireland, 23:2 MED. LAW. 237 (2004).
163. Id. at 246.
164. R. Farragher, B. Marsh, & J.G. Laffey, Maternal brain death--an Irish perspective,
174:4 IR. J. MED. SCI. 55, 57 (2005).
165. DEIRDRE MADDEN, MEDICINE, ETHICS AND THE LAW IN IRELAND 547 (2d ed. 2011).

166. Id. (citing Per Denham J, In the Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401, 419).

Winter 2016]

MATERNAL BRAIN DEATH

61

court could compel life support to be removed from the 45-year-old
Other cases have examined similar issues, but none have
woman.
67
explicitly addressed brain death until the recent P.P. case.1
d. Constitutional Provisions
In Ireland, the state must protect "the personal rights of the citizen,"
and defend "the life, person, good name, and property rights of every
citizen" under Article 40.3 of the Irish Constitution.' 68 Article 40.3.3,
discussed in further detail below, explicitly places the life of a woman and
69
There are also interpretations of
the life of her fetus on equal footing.'
Article 40.3.1 that imply unenumerated rights to marital privacy and
70
maternal care of a child.'
e. Abortion Laws
The Irish constitution places the life of a mother and the life of a fetus
on equal footing, affording the same rights and protections to both
entities.' 7 ' In this devoutly Catholic country, the "pro-life" amendment
was added to the Constitution in 1983 to expressly prohibit abortion in the
wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision. Article 40.3.3 of
the Irish Constitution reads, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the
unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to
defend and vindicate that right." 7 2 Enacted as an absolute ban on abortion,
the amendment remained infallible for over two decades, until it was
finally challenged in the European Court of Human Rights in August 2005.
In the case A, B, C v. Ireland, three women (A, B, and C) alleged violations
of their basic rights under three Articles of the European Convention on
Human Rights. 73 The Court's final ruling, issued in 2010 by a three-judge
167. See P.P. v. Health Service Executive, [2014] I.E.H.C. 622 (Ir.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2014/H622.htmil; see also Re T (adult: refusal of
medical treatment) CA [1992] 4 All ER 649 per Lord Donaldson MR; Re S (adult: refusal of
medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671, Family Division, Sir Stephen Brown P presiding;
Re MB [1997] 8 Med LR 217.
40.3,
art.
1937
Ireland
of
168. Constitution
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/en/constitution/index.html.
40.3.3,
art.
1937
Ireland
of
169. Constitution
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/en/constitution/index.html.
40.3.1,
art.
1937
Ireland
of
170. Constitution
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/en/constitution/index.html.
171. See Sonya Rahders, Global Abortion Law, History, and Practice: A Summary of
Twenty-One Countries, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW (J. Douglas Butler & David
F. Walbert eds., 6th ed.) (forthcoming 2015).
172. Sinead O'Carroll, History lesson: What happened during the 1983 abortion
referendum?, THEJOURNAL.IE (Dec. 27, 2013, 7:45 AM), http://www.thejoumal.ie/abortionreferendum-I 983-what-happened-I 225430-Dec2013/.
173. See ABC v Ireland, IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION (IFPA),
http://www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/Abortion/ABC-v-Ireland (last visited May 1, 2015); Mir~ad
Enright, A, B & C v. Ireland: The Basics, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND (Dec. 16, 2010),
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panel, held unanimously that Ireland's law violated the Convention. The
Irish government responded to the ruling with the Protection of Life During
Pregnancy Act of 2013,174 creating exceptions to the ban in cases where
"there is a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman's life .
resulting from physical illness or suicide,176 or an "immediate risk" in
emergency.1 77 In any case, the decision must be approved and certified by
at least two physicians. If a pregnant person cannot receive physician
certification, she may appeal to a review committee comprised of
physicians and psychiatrists, who will render a decision within seven
days.178 Unfortunately, the vagueness of the new risk threshold and the
cumbersome bureaucratic appeal process mean the exception makes little
difference in practice. 79
f. Right to Refuse Health Care
In Ireland a competent person has the right to refuse health care, after a
1965 Supreme Court case established the right to bodily integrity. 1s In
Ryan v. Attorney General, a woman objected to required fluoridation of
public water supply because of its potential health impacts on her family.' 8 1
While the court found that the plaintiff could show no actual harmful
effects of fluoride, they nonetheless affirmed an interpretation of
Constitutional Article 40.3 conferring an un-enumerated right to bodily
integrity. 18 2 In 1996, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this idea as it relates to
health care, holding that no person may be compelled to accept medical
treatment, even if such refusal results in death.' 83
g. Death With Dignity Laws
There is no death with dignity law in Ireland - assisted suicide is
illegal. There have been repeated unsuccessful attempts to introduce a bill
to repeal that prohibition.' 84 In the aforementioned case In re a Ward of
http://humanrights.ie/constitution-of-ireland/a-b-c-v-ireland-the-basics/.
174. Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (Act No. 35/2013) (Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/act/35/enacted/en/pdf.
175. Id. at § 7(1)(a)(i).
176. Id. at § 9(1)(a)(i).
177. Id. at § 8()(a).
178. Id. at § 10-13.
179. Ireland's new abortion guidelines endanger the lives and rights of women and girls,
AMNESTY
INT'L
(Sept.
19,
2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/09/ireland-s-new-abortion-guIdelinesendanger-lives-and-rights-women-and-girls/.
180. See John Lombard, Can the State Intervene in Cases ofMaternal-FoetalConflict?, 17
IRISH STUDENT L. REV. 129, 133 (2010).
181. DEIRDRE MADDEN, MEDICINE, ETHICS AND THE LAW IN IRELAND 547 (2d ed. 2011)

(citing Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] IR 345 (Supreme Court)).
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing In re a Ward of Court (No. 2) [1996] 2 IR 79).
184. See Michelle Hennessy, The three landmarkcases that shaped assisted suicide law in
Ireland, THEJOURNAL.IE, (Nov. 21, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.thejournal.ie/assisted-
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Court, the majority concurring judges pointed out that the "right to life"
that the court considered necessarily included a right to die a natural
death.'
"[T]his does not give a right to terminate one's own life or to have
death accelerated. It is confined to the natural process of dying. Loss of
mental capacity does not result in the diminution of that person's
Constitutional rights and in this case the ward's right to life necessarily
implies a right to die a natural death. The cause of death would not be the
withdrawal of food and nutrition, but the original injuries she sustained ...
,,186

That is, then, in Ireland a person has the right to refuse medical
interventions, or be removed from artificial life support; nothing in their
mental deterioration prior to death removes that right.
h. Organ Donation
Ireland is referred to as an "informed consent country" for organ
donation. 87 There is no specific law in Ireland regarding organ donation,
but they follow guidelines from the United Kingdom. The U.K. Human
Tissue Act of 2004 established an agency called the Human Tissue
Authority to oversee organ donation, and reaffirmed that "[c]onsent is the
fundamental principle of the legislation and underpins the lawful removal,
storage and use of body parts, organs and tissue. Different consent
requirements apply when dealing with tissue from the deceased and the
living."' 88 One analysis pointed out that the population of brain dead or
"beating-heart" donors was decreasing significantly, and the Act's
89
There was
emphasis on consent was an effort to expand the donor pool.1
significant backlash to the Act's provisions in the U.K., as people found the
idea of an opt-in donor system distasteful and an abuse of misappropriated
"right" to other people's organs.190

suicide-1184429-Nov2013/.
185. MADDEN, supra note 182 at 548.
186. Id.
187. Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation on
Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH EcONOMICs 599, 618

(2006), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.387.4126&
rep=rep I &type=pdf.
188. Human Tissue Authority (U.K.), Human Tissue Act 2004, https://www.hta.gov.uk/

human-tissue-act-2004#sthash.869ZNL9B.dpuf (last visited May 17, 2015).
189. M. D. D. Bell, The UK Human Tissue Act and consent: surrenderinga fundamental
principle to transplantation needs?, 32:5 J. MED. ETHICS 283, 284 (2006), available at

http://www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2579415/pdf/283.pdf.
190. Id. at 285.
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III. CONCLUSION
Faced with this disparity and the recent rise in questions of maternal
brain death, a medical ethicist recently proposed that all hospitals should
have specific protocols in place to deal with such matters.' 9 1 Similar
concerns have been raised worldwide, and will likely only increase as
medical technology makes prolongation of somatic support increasingly
possible. Each of the three countries surveyed above have very different
constitutions, legal landscapes, and public perceptions of the issue. Indeed,
it is clear that the lack of cohesive regulation or standard practice for cases
of maternal brain death leads to confusion and heartache. Lawmakers
should be prepared to address these matters explicitly within the evolving
landscapes of reproductive rights, organ donation, and consent to medical
care. 192

&

191. Jeffrey P. Spike, Pregnancy, Brain Death, and Posthumous Motherhood: A
ProvisionalPolicy Proposal, 14:8 AM. J. BIOETHICs 48, 48 (2014); see also A.A. Shiekh
D.A. Cusack, Maternal Brain Death, Pregnancy and the Foetus: The Medico-Legal
Implicationsfor Ireland, 23:2 MED. LAw. 237, 249 (2004).
192. A more in-depth proposal for specific measures is beyond the scope of the
constitutional survey undertaken in this comment, but will likely be the subject of a
subsequent paper.

